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Krzysztof  Brzechczyn
The Reliability of  “Files” and Collaboration with 
the Security Service (SB) in Poland: An Attempt at a 
Methodological Analysis 
Over the course of  the last decade, the disclosure in Poland of  information regarding 
the secret collaboration of  public fi gures with the Security Services (SB) has triggered 
emotional discussions on the reliability of  the archival records stored in the Institute 
of  National Remembrance (IPN). Analysis of  these discussions enables one to draw a 
distinction between two opposing views. According to the fi rst, documents stored in 
the archives of  the IPN are incomplete and devoid of  accurate information. According 
to the second, documents produced by the repressive apparatus of  the communist state 
constitute a new type of  historical source and contain reliable information.
However, these discussions concerning the reliability of  “fi les” lack methodological 
rigor and precision. I consider the reliability of  the “fi les” in the light of  Gerard Labuda 
and Jerzy Topolski’s concepts of  historical sources. According to this analysis, the 
“fi les” do not constitute a new type of  historical source requiring a radical rethinking 
of  existing classifi cations and new interpretive methods. However, one precondition 
of  an adequate interpretation is the acknowledgment of  the purpose for which they 
were created and the functions they played in the communist state. The repressive 
apparatus collected, selected and stored information on society if  they considered this 
information useful in the maintenance of  political control over society. Ignorance of  or 
failure to acknowledge this specifi c social praxis (and its different forms: manipulation, 
disintegration, misinformation, etc.) performed by the secret political police is one of  
the reasons for methodical and heuristic errors committed by historians: the uncritical 
application of  the vision of  social life and processes presented in these sources for the 
construction of  the historical narrative.
Keywords: adaptive interpretation, reliability of  the historical sources, Gerard Labuda, 
Jerzy Topolski, surveillance, Security Service, secret political police  
The Issue of  the Reliability of  “Files” for the First Time: An Analysis of  an 
Example
After 2000, as the Institute of  National Remembrance (hereinafter the “IPN”) 
commenced its activity, sources pertaining to or compiled by the communist 
apparatus of  repression became widely available to researchers who study the 
history of  Poland in 1944–1989. However, as soon as some of  the fi ndings 
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of  research conducted on the basis of  archival records of  the IPN were 
published, some journalists, ordinary people and professional historians rejected 
the historiographical credibility of  the documentation created by the Security 
Service (SB) and its related authorities in the times of  the People’s Republic of  
Poland (PRL). 
A symptomatic opinion was expressed by Antoni Pawlak, an oppositional 
activist, poet and journalist, at the panel discussion arranged at the Chamber 
Scene of  the “Polski” Theatre in Wrocław:
There is something that as we lived in the 1970s, 1980s and earlier—
the times the fundamental rule of  which (the rule around which our 
lives were organized) was a lie—books, press, yearly books, economic 
reports—I do not understand how we can claim that the only base of  
truth was the Security Service. It boggles my mind.1
More systematic charges were formulated by Karol Modzelewski, nota 
bene a prominent historian of  the Middle Ages, who claimed that the minimal 
usefulness of  these sources to historians was a result of, fi rst, the incompleteness 
of  the source database.
General Kiszczak and his people were the sole masters of  the fi les 
for as long as six months and they already knew that they would have 
to hand over the ministry, together with those documents, to their 
political opponents. From the very beginning it was naive to believe 
that they left anything in the fi les that was not appropriate to be read.2
Second, he emphasized the minimal reliability of  the archival documents, 
“In the mind of  a person who would seek to conjure the truth about the agency 
on the basis of  unreliable remnants of  documentation experience and logic has 
been replaced with wishes.”3 
On the other hand, historians and researchers who used the archival records 
of  the IPN generally believe that this type of  archival resource, which is essential 
to the study of  the recent history of  Poland, is quite reliable. Joanna Siedlecka, 
1 “Artyšci i SB. Aparat bezpieczeństwa wobec šrodowisk twórczych. Dyskusja panelowa – 19 kwietnia 
2007,” in Artyšci a SłuŽba Bezpieczeństwa. Aparat bezpieczeństwa wobec šrodowisk twórczych, ed. Robert 
Klementowski and Sebastian Ligarski (Wrocław: IPN, 2008), 220.
2 Karol Modzelewski, “Dyktatura ciemniaków,” Gazeta Wyborcza, September 4, 1992: 12.
3 Modzelewski, “Dyktatura ciemniaków,” 12.
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who researched the lives of  writers living in the People’s Republic of  Poland, 
made the following observation:
There is a huge and priceless knowledge about writers. After all, the 
Security Service left us the priceless material. Thanks to it, we know 
what Herbert said at an author’s meeting in Pcim or in Rzeszów because 
detailed notes were taken. In my opinion, there are documents, the 
reliability of  which simply cannot be challenged.4
Those who support the use of  the resources compiled by the apparatus of  
repression of  the People’s Republic of  Poland insist on the usefulness of  these 
materials to scholars of  the apparatus of  repression itself  and those parts of  
the past that were of  interest to the authorities and the police forces.5 In this 
context, it is stated, inter alia, that it is possible to reconstruct details of  many 
signifi cant events of  the political history of  the People’s Republic of  Poland,6 
the history of  the opposition and of  the Independent Self-Governing Trade 
Union “Solidarnošć,”7 and the process of  making decisions by authorities of  the 
People’s Republic of  Poland.8 
This opinion regarding the relatively high reliability of  the sources is 
associated with a warning against a specifi c vision of  the world represented by 
their authors:
…these archival records have a specifi c nature (my italics K.B.) that refl ects 
the activity of  the Security Service. Therefore, the knowledge included 
in the documentation made by the communist security apparatus 
is neither a complete nor a reliable image of  the People’s Republic 
of  Poland, but rather constitutes only a glimpse at the reality of  the 
4  “Artyšci i SB,” 224.
5  Andrzej Paczkowski, “Archiwa aparatu bezpieczeństwa PRL jako Żródło: co juŽ zrobiono, co moŽna 
zbadać,” Pamięć i Sprawiedliwošć 1, no. 3 (2003): 11; Paczkowski’s article details topics the reliable study of  
which requires documents of  the apparatus of  repression which were exceptionally valuable; they cover 
almost all fi elds of  private and public life in the People’s Republic of  Poland, Paczkowski, “Archiwa,” 
20–21. 
6  Andrzej Grajewski, “Ankieta historyczna,” Pamięć i Sprawiedliwošć 1, no. 3 (2003): 36.
7  Sławomir Cenckiewicz, “Znaczenie archiwaliów słuŽb specjalnych PRL w studiach nad dziejami NSZZ 
‘Solidarnošć,’” in “Solidarnošć” w imieniu narodu i obywateli, ed. Marek Latoszek (Krakow: Arcana, 2005), 218, 
220.
8  Andrzej Chojnowski’s opinion in the discussion: “Co kryją teczki? O tajnych współpracownikach 
bezpieki z Andrzejem Chojnowskim, Grzegorzem Majchrzakiem, Zbigniewem Nawrockim i Tadeuszem 
Ruzikowskim rozmawia Władysław Bułhak,” Biuletyn IPN 3 (2005): 19–20. 
260
Hungarian Historical Review 3,  no. 2  (2014): 257–284
People’s Republic of  Poland from the perspective of  the interests of  
the Security Service.9
On the other hand, according to Paweł Piotrowski, “We have to realize that 
this documentation was created for a specifi c purpose and portrays the image of  
the world that the authors saw or wanted to see.”10 
The issue of  the reliability of  the Security Service’s sources was broadly 
discussed by Adam Leszczyński, who in a chapter of  a book published in 2006 
and entitled “How Did the Authorities Themselves Lie: The Documentation of  
the Security Service and of  the Polish United Workers’ Party as a Source on the 
History of  the ‘Solidarnošć’ Trade Union” makes the following assessment:
The reliability of  the written sources created by various institutions 
of  the government and of  the party, from the Polish United Workers’ 
Party (PZPR) to the Security Service, leaves a lot to be desired. Since 
they distort the reality that they try to describe both at the factual 
level (their authors frequently and intentionally lie) and at the level of  
interpretation, they are saturated not only with gobbledygook, but also 
with a specifi c type of  the party’s glimpse of  reality.11
Leszczyński refers to the case of  the death of  the miner Jan Siminiak at the 
Civic Militia (MO) station in May 1981. In the “Details on Circumstances” cited 
by the author, the Security Service reported his death as an accident, “At the 
Civic Militia station, J. Siminiak fought with a Civic Militia offi cer, fell, and hit 
his head against the bench. The doctor declared him dead.”12 
Leszczyński comments on this description in the following way:
It is impossible to state whether the audience of  this report really 
believed this odd explanation (...). In view of  this report, the death 
of  Siminiak was a regrettable accident that befell a habitual drunk 
and troublemaker (...). It is worth emphasizing that the “Details on 
Circumstances” is an internal and top-secret document, but a Security 
Service offi cer was unable to make a less unilateral description of  the 
9  Filip Musiał, “Zamiast wprowadzenia: archiwalia komunistycznego aparatu represji,” in Wokół teczek 
bezpieki-zagadnienia metodologiczno-Żródłoznawcze, ed. Filip Musiał (Krakow: IPN, 2006), 56.
10  Paweł Piotrowski, “Metodologia badania dokumentów dotyczących “Solidarnošci” wytworzonych 
przez SłuŽbę Bezpieczeństwa,” in Wielkopolska ’Solidarnošć’ w materiałach aparatu represji (1980–1989), ed. 
Waldemat Handke (Poznań: IPN, 2006), 13.
11  Adam Leszczyński, Anatomia protestu. Strajki robotnicze w Olsztynie, Sosnowcu i żyrardowie, sierpień-listopad 
1981 (Warsaw: Trio, 2006), 39.   
12  Informacja sytuacyjna, IPN, BU 185n/16, 97 quoted in Leszczyński, Anatomia protestu, 40.
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event. He provided exactly the same version propagated by the State’s 
papers, radio and television.13
The document became the basis for a broad assessment of  materials made 
by the Security Service.
This complies with the norm observed by numerous researchers: the 
Security Service’s documents almost never make mention of  any acts 
committed by their offi cers that infringed on the law of  the People’s 
Republic of  Poland, such as beating or harassing people who were 
politically inconvenient. These drastic methods are passed over in 
silence, and when impossible, they are presented in a way that shows 
the offi cers in the best light, even if  the entire story seems ridiculous.14
The document is criticized in terms of  the postulated ideal historical 
source that includes any and all information on the topic that has captured the 
researcher’s interest: supports a “proper” interpretation (i.e. an interpretation that 
conforms with the researcher’s objectives) and contains no evasive or misleading 
statements. These expectations are not met by any of  the sources created by 
the Security Service, or by other institutions. Leszczyński himself  remarks on 
this, noting that the documents of  the Security Service and the Polish United 
Workers’ Party exaggerated differences in the internal views of  the Independent 
Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarnošć,” whereas trade union documents 
omitted any mention of  these internal divisions.15
If  the contentions contained in a source are knowing lies (as is indicated by 
the title of  the chapter) made to superiors by subordinates, clearly they cannot be 
regarded as reliable. However, whether or not these statements can be regarded 
as knowing lies has not been established. A statement can be characterized as 
a lie when it does not conform to the known details, the person who made the 
statement was aware of  this inconsistency, and he or she intended to mislead 
the person to whom the statement was addressed. Leszczyński does not support 
his conjecture with any arguments based on the source data. Yet in order to 
substantiate the claim that the statements in question were deliberate lies, it 
would be necessary to prove that the authors of  the report on the Siminiak 
case were aware of  inconsistencies with the facts and intended to mislead their 
13  Leszczyński, Anatomia protestu, 40.
14  Ibid., 40–41.
15  Ibid., 51–54. 
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superiors. In order to do this, it would be necessary to identify the authors of  
the report.
In addition, the following sentence is vague, “the Security Service’s 
documents almost never make mention of  any acts committed by offi cers of  the 
Security Service that infringed on the law of  the People’s Republic of  Poland, 
such as beating or harassing people who were politically inconvenient.” It is not 
clear how the expression “almost never” should be interpreted. Is it a general 
quantifi er or an existential one? 
The “Details on Circumstances” cited by Leszczyński was a document made 
in the Offi ce of  the Ministry of  Internal Affairs (hence strictly speaking it was not 
made by the Security Service, as Leszczyński claims) on the basis of  daily reports 
sent from individual voivodeships and departments of  the Ministry, e.g. the Civic 
Militia, Border Defense Troops (WOP), etc. The key role in the presentation 
of  information was played by a group of  people (the so-called distribution 
list) to whom the reports were sent. If  information was addressed to people 
holding the most prominent positions in the country (a list that came to several 
dozen names), it referred to general matters. For example, a schedule entitled 
“Assessments of  Establishing the Citizens’ Committee with Lech Wałęsa,” which 
contained opinions of  the “Fighting Solidarity” organization and the Liberal-
Democratic Party “Independence,” was addressed to 44 people in the country, 
including Alfred Miodowicz, whose son Konstanty was an opposition activist of  
the Freedom and Peace Movement.16 The “Daily Information” was permanently 
scheduled with the “Events with the Participation of  the Civic Militia Offi cers,” 
which generally contained information on violations of  the law by employees 
of  the Ministry and members of  the uniformed services. This schedule was 
usually addressed to one person in the State, Władysław PoŽoga or Czesław 
Kiszczak (at least in the late 1980s). It seems (although this would be a matter for 
further research since Leszczyński omits this question) that the document was 
addressed to a larger group of  people, and hence it contained a description of  
the event on the basis of  generally available information. Schedules exclusively 
addressed to the Minister of  Internal Affairs contained information on crimes 
(or suspicions regarding the commission of  a committing crime) committed by 
the offi cers of  the ministry.
16  Oceny powołania Komitetu Obywatelskiego przy Lechu Wałęsie. Załącznik do informacji dziennej, 1989-01-05, 
IPN, BU 1585/2301, 47.
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Example 1: On the 5th day of  this month, at around 1:00 a.m., the 
Provincial Offi ce of  Internal Affairs in Leszno was informed of  a 
burglary of  a shop run by citizen Kuczkowska in B. Chrobrego Street. 
A tracker dog led offi cers to the fl at, where Paweł Stefański, age 20, 
was caught. In the fl at the offi cers found the loot (jackets). The arrested 
was drunk. It turned out that he was a private of  the 6th Company 
of  the Operating Battalion of  the Motorized Reserves of  the Civic 
Militia (ZOMO) in Poznań (1st year of  service) and was on holiday. He 
confessed that he had broken into the shop.17 
This following description was included in the “Information on the Present 
Operational-Political Situation” sent on 20 May, 1982 from Poznań to Warsaw.
Example 2: On 18 May of  this year in the hospital in Lutycka Street, 
a 19-year-old named Piotr Majchrzak, a student of  the Secondary 
Technical School of  Gardening in Poznań, died. The mother of  the 
deceased, Teresa Majchrzak, a teacher in kindergarten no. 39, claims 
that his death resulted from him having been beaten by offi cers of  the 
Motorized Reserves of  the Civic Militia on the 12 May at 12:00 p.m. 
in Fredry Street near the church. She managed to fi nd witnesses to the 
incident who claim that the Civic Militia patrol stopped him when he 
was running towards tram no. 8, which was arriving at the time. They 
claim that there was a heated exchange between the offi cers and P. 
Majchrzak. The offi cers allegedly clubbed him. The witnesses claim 
that P. Majchrzak defended himself  with karate (he was a member of  
the “Feniks” karate club). When he lost his consciousness, the offi cers 
called the ambulance, which took him to hospital. The witnesses spoke 
with Majchrzak’s mother and warned that they would not present their 
version of  the event because they were afraid of  possible repressions.18 
The Security Service’s documents also contain information on the 
“harassment of  people who were politically inconvenient,” or at least information 
on plans to do so. 
Example 3: In the “Tram Driver” operational verifi cation the 
following actions were planned to be taken against Jan Lutter, vice-
chairman of  the Inter-Enterprise Founding Committee “Solidarnošć” 
of  the Greater Poland Region in 1980: 3) A relevant false story will 
17  WaŽniejsze wydarzenia z udziałem  funkcjonariuszy MO. Załącznik do informacji dziennej, 1989-01-05, IPN, 
BU 1585/2301, 48.
18  Informacja dot.[ycząca] aktualnej sytuacji operacyjno-politycznej. IPN Po 06/215/14/1, 8. 
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be used to talk with selected individuals (...) in order to learn more 
about a fi gurehead, his/her contacts (...) and learn about his/her 
interests, weaknesses and tendencies (...). 6) Check the fi gurehead 
in the following available records: the Personal Data Offi ce, general 
registry, Passport Department, criminal record, Traffi c Department, 
Sobering Station (...) 7) Examine the fi gurehead’s family, his/her past, 
places of  residence and employment in order to determine his or her 
motives and learn more about his/her personality (...). 9) Use “B” to 
examine further (...) and document his/her possible hostile activity or 
situations that discredit him/her (...). 10) By using any and all possible 
operational measures and possibilities and any and all possible materials 
that discredit the fi gurehead, his/her position, among other things, in 
the workplace and place of  residence will be weakened and his/her 
possible hostile activity will be neutralized.19
These plans and deeds of  the Security Service, plans and deeds that could 
result in violence against or endangering the life of  the people targeted, were 
enigmatically called “disintegrating actions,” “destructive,” “harasser,” or 
“special actions” according to a “separate plan” or an “annex to such plans,” 
but such plans could never be made in writing, or if  made in writing, they were 
destroyed.20 
The Issue of  the Reliability of  “Files” for the Second Time, in Light of  Jerzy 
Topolski’s Concept of  the Dynamic Historical Source 
Opponents in the debate regarding the “low” or “high” reliability of  the archival 
records of  the apparatus of  repression adopt several common assumptions. 
They implicitly assume that the reliability of  documents is a constant property 
of  historical sources and this property is independent of  the problem under 
discussion or the research questions posed. I contend that this assumption is 
19  Przemysław Zwiernik, “Rozpracowanie Motorniczego,” Pamięć i Sprawiedliwošć 1, no. 4 (2003): 347–49.
20  This remark was made by Przemysław Zwiernik, who describes how, as part of  “the operating 
action plan of  the Security Service of  the Provincial Civic Militia Station in Poznań, aimed at working 
out and liquidating the existing underground structures of  the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union 
‘Solidarnošć in Poznań,’ made in August 1982,” an “annex” was added to the plan in which “special 
operating care” (an expression used by the Security Service) was applied to father Tomasz Alexiewicz and 
father Honoriusz Stanisław Kowalczyk. The “annex” to the operating action plan has not yet been found. 
It is worth mentioning that father Honoriusz died in a car accident the circumstances of  which remained 
shrouded in mystery in April 1983; see: Przemysław Zwiernik, “Rozkaz: rozbić podziemie. Działania 
SłuŽby Bezpieczeństwa wobec poznańskiej opozycji,” Głos Wielkopolski, January 9, 2007.   
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unfounded. According to Topolski’s concept of  the dynamic historical source, 
“a historical source is (...) any and all sources of  historical cognition (direct and 
indirect), i.e. all information (including theory and information) on the social 
past, irrespective of  its place, together with its communication (channel of  
communication).”21 Moreover, Topolski differentiates between a potential source 
and an effective one. He claims that the potential source is everything on the basis 
of  which a historian is able to gain knowledge of  the past, whereas the effective 
source is the group of  information that is actually used by a historian.
This manner of  apprehending the concept of  the historical source implies 
that its reliability is relative, id est it is affected by the research question actually 
posed by the historian. The same source may be relatively highly reliable in the 
case of  one research question and less reliable in the case of  another. It is worth 
citing Topolski again:
Therefore, one of  the keys that shapes the mechanism of  the use or 
interpretation of  source information (in other words, the study of  a 
source) is the research question to which the source is supposed to 
provide an answer. Without such a question, the source does not tell a 
historian anything. It remains silent, even if  a historian is able to read 
it. By posing these questions, obviously structured by the historian’s 
knowledge, which expands beyond the individual source under 
scrutiny (and the entire methodological consciousness), the historian 
preliminary models the reality that is the subject of  his/her research.22
To characterize the information structure of  the source, Topolski used the 
notion apparatus of  Jerzy Kmita’s theory of  a sign.23 The Polish philosopher of  
logic and history assumed that a sign is an activity or a product of  human activity 
that is a result of  the intentional communication of  a given state of  affairs. In 
addition to signs, there are symptoms that can be divided into humanistic and 
natural. Humanistic symptoms are human activities or products that are not 
intentionally created for the purpose of  communication by their creator. For 
example, smoke coming from the chimney means that people are at home and 
they are making a meal, but this message is not the intentional outcome of  the 
dwellers. 
21  Jerzy Topolski, Metodologia historii (Warsaw: PWN, 1984), 324.
22  Jerzy Topolski, Teoria wiedzy historycznej (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1983), 257.
23  Jerzy Kmita, Wykłady z logiki i metodologii nauk (Warsaw: PWN, 1973), 32–33, 210–11.  
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Topolski distinguished three layers of  the source information structure. 
A surface layer of  the information structure of  the source is a collection of  
“information that may be extracted from it in the simplest way, id est it is clear 
without posing questions other than the questions directly included in this 
collection of  information.”24 This refers to the most fundamental questions, 
such as what, who, where or when. A sign layer of  the information structure of  
the historical source means the possibly intended purpose of  the information 
originally communicated. In contrast, a symptom layer of  the information 
structure contains the possible pieces of  information that were not intended 
to communicate directly with their audience. These pieces of  information may 
reveal the author’s worldview, his/her vision of  the social world, or hidden 
assumptions regarding the political, cultural and economical situation. 
Example 4: After October 1956 the Communist party toughened the 
policy towards the Catholic Church. One of  the symptoms of  this 
was the decree of  the Ministry of  Education of  August 1958 that 
provided for removing crosses from school classes in all schools in 
Poland. This decision was met with protests of  parents and children. 
In the Zielona Góra voivodeship, such protests were held from 31 
August to 15 September 1958 in several dozen rural schools.25 The 
daily information on protests signed by lieutenant colonel Bolesław 
Galczewski, 1st security deputy of  the commander of  the Voivodeship 
Civic Militia Station, was sent to colonel Marian Janica, a deputy of  
the director of  the Offi ce of  the Minister of  Internal Affairs. This 
information included a detailed description of  protests in individual 
places and harsh criticism of  the authorities: “what October gave us, 
September will take,” “we demand religion in schools, we demand 
crosses, we are not in captivity, Gomułka does not govern himself,” 
“Poland is a Russian colony,” “What are you doing with this Poland: 
a Russian republic?” “Gomułka made it but he will be removed as 
well,” “Crosses were in schools in the time of  Hitler, Stalin and Beirut, 
and now you are removing them.” These statements explicitly show 
that the confl ict was politicized and the protesters’ demands to restore 
crosses in schools changed into criticism of  Gomułka, the system, and 
Poland’s dependence on the Soviet Union. However, in a collective 
24  Topolski, Teoria, 263.
25  For further details, see: Krzysztof  Brzechczyn, “Protesty przeciwko zdejmowaniu krzyŽy w szkołach 
województwa zielonogórskiego w sierpniu-wrzešniu 1958 roku,” in Kultura i społeczeństwo na Šrodkowym 
Nadodrzu w XIX i XX wieku, ed. Przemysław Bartkowiak and Dawid Kotlarek (Zielona Góra: Pro Libris, 
2008), 234–43.
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report of  17 September, 1958 to the Offi ce of  the Minister of  Internal 
Affairs lieutenant colonel Galczewski omitted mention of  the size of  
the protest and claimed that, “by analyzing the Catholic clergy, it is said 
that priests do not offi cially partake in confl icts arising in individual 
gatherings. In addition, outside churches the clergy clearly does not stir 
up people to manifest and protest against the secularization of  schools. 
(...) We still do not have any indications of  any reactionaries who have 
become active because all previous confl icts in the rural areas involved 
mostly fanatics and women. Moreover, these confl icts are not clearly 
hostile because these protests are frequently limited to demands to 
restore religion and crosses in schools.”26
By posing the question of  who protested against the removal of  the crosses 
and also where and how, we come to the surface layer of  the information 
structure of  the source, id est the aforesaid report. By posing a question regarding 
what the 1st security deputy of  the commander of  the Provincial Civic Militia 
Station in Zielona Góra wished to communicate in his report to the Director 
of  the Offi ce of  the Minister of  Internal Affairs by omitting mention of  the 
political dimensions of  the protests, we come to the sign layer of  the information 
structure of  the source. Further on, by posing a question regarding why the 1st 
security deputy of  the commander of  the Voivodeship Civic Militia Station in 
Zielona Góra emphasized that the protesters “were mainly women” (although 
3 out of  8 of  the people arrested people were men), we come to the symptom 
layer of  the information structure.
One can formulate a preliminary hypothesis that the report omitted the 
political aspects of  the protests in order to communicate to the Offi ce of  the 
Ministry of  Internal Affairs in Warsaw that the author of  the report was in 
complete control of  his territory. On the other hand, the emphasis of  the key 
role of  women in the protests might be a symptom of  the belief  (hypothetically) 
shared by the author and his superiors that the proper places for women were 
the private and religious spheres, hence the collective participation of  women in 
the protests proved the non-political character of  the acts.27
26  Informacja nr 61/58, 17 IX 1958, IPN Po 060/44/55, vol. 85, 110.
27  It is worth citing opinions of  female members of  the Solidarity underground movement involved 
in publishing the Tygodnik Mazowsze, “(...) the Security Service didn’t take us for granted. It didn’t cross 
their mind that a woman, when it’s dark, won’t be afraid of  going across the park or along the cemetery. 
The stereotype that a woman is less intelligent and won’t be part of  the underground movement or have 
operational concepts, fi nd a radio station, or lead this movement (...) in this case it acted for our benefi t.” 
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The Content of  “Files” According to Topolski’s Source Classifi cation 
In order to determine more precisely the specifi city of  the secret collaborator’s 
denunciation and other operational fi les, it is necessary to have a more general 
system of  classifying the sources. Topolski accepts the conventional division 
of  historical documents into direct and indirect sources. This division is based 
on the assumption that direct sources should “directly” refl ect the past reality, 
whereas indirect sources should do it through an informant. This informant 
can take many forms, such as a chronicler or a diary keeper who informs a 
historian about a certain fragment of  the past reality. The use of  indirect sources 
requires the study of  their authenticity and reliability or their internal criticism. 
As for direct sources, there are no such informants because the direct sources 
themselves are elements of  the historical reality. In this case, only the authenticity 
of  the sources is examined.28 Differences between both types of  sources are 
shown in the following table:29
Direct sources Indirect sources
(1) direct cognition
(2) no intermediary 
(3) no need to examine their reliability 
(authenticity must be examined) 
indirect cognition
presence of  an intermediary 
necessity of  examining the reliability of  the 
informant 
 
Another way of  classifying sources is according to the division between 
addressed sources and non-addressed sources. The mode of  division here is based 
on the existence of  information that directly links the participants of  the 
communication process (type: addressor–information channel–audience), in this 
case between a source author and a historian (or another recipient). This division 
does not refer to the material aspect of  sources (information carrier), but only 
to information included in sources.30 Topolski claims that “addressed sources 
are directly intended as forms of  communication, whereas non-addressed 
“We had the feeling that we were living in a ‘macho’ state and hence men were caught much more easily, 
whereas women were beyond all suspicion.”; Ewa Malinowska, “Niekobieca  Solidarnošć,” in “Solidarnošć,” 
141.
28  Topolski, Metodologia, 329.; Idem, Teoria, 260.
29  Idem, Metodologia, 329.
30  Idem, Teoria, 260.
The Reliability of  “Files”
269
sources are not.”31 The intention of  communicating information implies that 
addressed sources contain an element of  persuasion that is addressed to the 
audience, whereas the source itself  includes the interpretation of  information 
that it carries.32 According to Topolski, this means that, “A historian who wishes 
to extract information from such sources must have his own interpretation, 
i.e. he or she interprets the interpretation already included in the source. The 
examination of  the reliability of  the informant, that is to say, whether or not he 
tells the truth in a given situation (…) is not enough here.”33 In order to extract 
information on facts from this type of  source, a historian must strip the source 
of  its rhetorical, persuasive and interpretative elements.
The addressed sources can be classifi ed into certain categories, depending 
on whether or not they are addressed to: (1) an audience that is contemporaneous 
with the source author (e.g. letters, reports, announcements); (2) posterity 
(funerary inscriptions, documents  on a person’s rights); (3) historians (numerous 
memoirs are kept for this purpose, occasional publications, etc.).34
By combining these two classifi cations, we obtain the following typology of  
sources:  
Intended  or not intended 
to convey information 
Existence or non-existence 
of  the informant 
Addressed Non-addressed
Indirect Indirect addressed







(scaffolding after the pyramid)
In terms of  the source classifi cation developed by Topolski, it is possible 
to detect what the secret collaborator’s denunciations mean: they are indirect 
addressed sources. The specifi c nature of  this type of  source is its narrative 
structure, which is comprised of  informative, rhetoric, and  ideological-theoretical 
31 Ibid., 260.
32 Idem, Jak się pisze i rozumie historię. Tajemnice narracji historycznej (Warsaw: Rytm, 1996), 340.
33 Ibid., 341.
34 Idem, Teoria, 260.
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layers.35 The ideological-theoretical layer covers the interpretation and/or the 
explanation of  facts presented by the source author. This narrative aspect 
controls the remaining rhetorical and informative layers as well. This control 
aims to select and hierarchize information carried by the historical source and 
adequately to apply rhetorical clues that are intended to convince a potential 
reader of  the document to interpret the reality presented by the author (authors) 
of  the source. This interpreter is the historian, who uses knowledge obtained 
from other sources and various heuristic procedures to strip the source of  the 
theoretical-ideological and rhetorical layers and obtains information regarding 
relevant historical facts. Therefore, the so-called source optics comprising, among 
other things, a specifi c vision of  the world and humankind, is not the specifi city 
of  the secret collaborator’s denunciations or documents of  the Security Service, 
but rather a general feature of  any and all indirect addressed sources. 
The secret collaborator’s denunciation as an indirect addressed source 
is included in category (1), which means that it is addressed to an audience 
that is contemporaneous with the source (information) author. Hence, I have 
determined the nearest type to which the secret collaborator’s denunciation 
belongs. Now, I am going to identify the specifi c differences of  the 
collaborator’s denunciation. In order to do this, I have to expand Topolski’s 
classifi cation. I divide indirect addressed sources into sources addressed 
unlimitedly and limitedly. 
An article in a daily newspaper is available to all people who know a given 
language. However, papers in Studia Logica, for example, are in principle available 
to everyone who completes a form and orders this journal in a relevant library, 
but it is doubtful whether these articles are equally comprehensible by everyone. 
The mode of  distributing the source of  information constitutes another means 
of  limiting the audience. The state documents classifi ed as “top secret” do 
not distinguish themselves by their sophisticated terminology (they need to be 
understood by democratically elected authorities), but access to them is strictly 
restricted.
In the extreme case of  a source that is only addressed to its creator (e.g. a 
personal memoir) represents a non-addressed source. In this case, it is better to 
replace the dichotomous division (addressed and non-addressed sources) with a 
gradable division, depending on the number of  persons in the audience to which 
the source (according to its author’s intentions) is addressed.
35  Idem, Jak się pisze, 346. 
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Thus we arrive at an understanding of  another aspect of  the secret 
collaborator’s denunciation: this is the indirect addressed source addressed to 
a limited audience. A secret collaborator of  the Security Service who made 
a denunciation, whether handwritten or not, was convinced that his or her 
cooperation with the Security Service would remain secret and the authorship 
of  the denunciation would remain anonymous to strangers and more specifi cally 
to anyone to whom he or she was close or was tied. In an extreme case, the 
secret collaborator could even be convinced that the information was exclusively 
provided to the Security Service offi cer to whom he or she reported. The distinctly 
outlined group of  recipients affected the source language and posed problems 
with regards to reading the source information (decoding). Topolski distinguished 
the informant’s ethnic language code, epochal language code (terminological), 
psychological code and graphical code. The language in the Security Service’s 
documents pertains to the terminological code: a specifi c language that needs to 
be understood and decoded.36 This, however, is not only peculiar to the police 
denunciation, but a characteristic of  all the indirect addressed sources, whether 
limited or not, including the explicit or implicit ideological vision of  the world 
of  its creators.
The question is whether such considerations mean anything concerning 
the reliability of  the denunciation itself  and other materials based on it and 
made by the Security Service. Is an anonymous opinion on Smith expressed by 
a person who was convinced that Smith would never know its content more 
reliable than an offi cial opinion on Smith expressed by a person who was aware 
of  the fact that Smith may learn its content?37 It seems that it is impossible 
to provide general answers to this question. Understanding that Smith will not 
learn the content of  the denunciation of  him may affect the conveyance of  both 
misleading information, gossip, and unverifi ed hearsay and reliable information. 
On the other hand, the possibility of  misleading the Security Service by the 
secret collaborators was limited. As a rule, in a given social environment the 
36  Łukasz Kamiński, “Lingua securitas,” in Wokół teczek bezpieki. Zagadnienia metodologiczno-Żródłoznawcze, 
ed. Filip Musiał (Krakow: IPN, 2006), 393–98; Andrzej Paczkowski, “Bardzo krótki słownik wywiadu,” in 
Wokół teczek bezpieki, 399–404; Filip Musiał, Podręcznik bezpieki. Teoria pracy operacyjnej SłuŽby Bezpieczeństwa w 
šwietle wydawnictw resortowych Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych PRL (Krakow: IPN, 2007), 325–52.  
37  Although a secret collaborator might often have thought that the information he or she passed on 
was solely for the consumption of  the offi cer to whom he or she reported, about 20 to 30 people in the 
Ministry had knowledge of  the secret collaborator’s registration and access to his or her denunciations; Z. 
Nawrocki, statements in the discussion: “Co kryją teczki?” Biuletyn IPN 3 (2005): 15–16. 
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Security Service used more than one Security Serviceman. This enabled them 
to verify the reliability and utility of  the information that the agents provided.
The Role of  “Files” in the Political Enslavement Practice 
Gerard Labuda says that a historical source is 
…any psychophysical or social relic that, as a product of  human labor 
and at the same time an object that participates in the development 
of  social life, acquires through this participation the capacity to refl ect 
that development. Because of  these properties (i.e. being a product 
of  labor and having the capacity to refl ect phenomena), a source is a 
means of  cognition that enables us scientifi cally to reconstruct social 
development in all its manifestations.38 
Since, according to this concept, “sources are a result of  the action of  the 
entire historical process,”39 they should refl ect all its fundamental elements, 
including economic, social, political, and cultural.40 A given historical source 
should refl ect those aspects of  the historical process that are the most actively 
involved in its creation “with particular distinctness.” According to the directive 
provided by Labuda, “in order to understand the role of  a document, an analysis 
conducted with respect to the historical sphere that contributed to its creation is 
of  fundamental signifi cance.”41  
Information collected by the Security Service was used for a certain type 
of  social practice: the political enslavement and enforcement of  social control 
over the whole society. Therefore, the process of  recruiting personal sources of  
information and the collection and selection of  knowledge obtained through 
these sources did not constitute the aim in and of  itself. Rather, these processes 
were used to achieve a certain social practice: the control of  individual social 
milieus. It is worth noting that the forms and methods of  this control changed 
over time. In the early period of  the People’s Republic of  Poland, open forms 
of  repression were used, including the liquidation of  independent civic social 
38  Gerard Labuda, “Próba nowej systematyki i nowej interpretacji Żródeł historycznych,” Studia 
źródłoznawcze 1 (1957): 22; in another version of  his defi nition, Labuda referred to the historical source as 
“a product of  (…) natural and social processes.” (Ibid., 22).
39  Ibid., 24.
40  Ibid., 23, 27.
41  Ibid., 33.
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environments, whereas in the late period of  the People’s Republic of  Poland 
other means were used, as described by Filip Musiał:
not repression, but manipulation, not arrests, but inspiration and 
disintegration were the fundamental weapons in the Security Service 
offi cers’ fi ght at the close of  the People’s Republic of  Poland. Therefore, 
with regards to the activities of  the Security Service, a benchmark of  
success was not the liquidation of  a given form or circle of  opposition, 
but rather the acquisition of  control over it, either in whole or in 
part, or the successful dismantling of  it. In simple terms, it would be 
necessary to consider the change that took place in operations of  the 
Security Service as consisting in a shift away from functioning as the 
“punishing arm” of  the Party in the 1940s and 1950s and becoming 
a specifi c demiurge whose basic task was to hold all aces behind the 
scenes on the stage of  the Polish opposition in the 1980s. One of  the 
tools that allowed the Security Service to perform these acts was the 
logistic and informative advantage that resulted from the operation 
of  the informant network. This perspective arises from an analysis 
of  changes in the operational work: we will be able to examine the 
Security Service’s real effectiveness only on the basis of  practical cases, 
games and combinations.42
It seems that the instructions of  the Security Service’s operational work to 
which Filip Musiał refers were somehow delayed in recording the change that 
took place in the manner in which social life was controlled in the mid-1970s.43 
The core criterion of  the recruitment process of  the secret collaborators, who 
operated in various social circles, was fi rst and foremost the ability to exert 
effective control over them, and not to have broad knowledge of  them. 
Example 5: A work schedule for the 4th Section of  the 3rd Department 
of  the Regional Internal Affairs Offi ce in Wrocław made a plan regarding 
personal sources of  information recruitment consisting of  recruiting 
two secret collaborators in the literary circle, one secret collaborator 
in the fi ne arts circle, two secret collaborators in the theatre circle, two 
secret collaborators in the music circle and two secret collaborators 
in the culture promotion circle. The section’s work schedule did not, 
42  Ibid., 323.
43  Łukasz Kamiński, “Władza wobec opozycji 1976–1989,” Pamięć i Sprawiedliwošć 1, no. 4 (2003): 9–32, 
and “Opozycja w działaniach władz PRL. Dyskusja z udziałem Antoniego Dudka, Jerzego Eislera, Andrzeja 
Friszke, Henryka Głębockiego, Łukasza Kamińskiego i Grzegorza Waligóry,” Pamięć i Sprawiedliwošć 1, no. 
4 (2003): 33–67.
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however, stipulate the recruitment of  secret collaborators in the 
Wrocław fi lmmakers’ circle because there were already as many as 
eight secret collaborators operating in that sphere, which justifi ed the 
decision: “since the group of  fi lmmakers and people dealing with the 
production and distribution of  fi lms is fl ooded with personal sources 
of  information who suffi ciently control this circle, new recruitments 
are not scheduled for this year.”44
As the operational documents of  the Security Service demonstrate, there 
was nothing in which this organization was not interested. The assessments of  
works by Ryszard Krynicki, which were done, along with similar operations, as 
part of  the “Renegat,” “Sosna” and “Lingwista” operating inquiries, offer telling 
examples.45 
Example 6: Ryszard Krynicki’s political poetry from the early 1970s 
aroused drew the attention of  the Security Service to the poet himself  
and hence it had to acquaint itself  with his poems. In February 1973 
the 3rd Department of  the Regional Committee of  the Civic Militia in 
Krakow, where Krynicki studied, decided to have an “operating talk” 
with the poet. In order to prepare for that talk, the Security Service 
offi cer who was in charge of  the case asked the 3rd Department of  
the Regional Committee of  the Civic Militia in Katowice (previously 
the poet had lived in the Katowice voivodeship) to describe the poet. 
The “Opinion,” dated 30 January, 1973 read as follows: “The local 
literary circle considers Ryszard Krynicki one of  the best followers 
of  the ‘poetic linguistic school, the spiritual father of  which was 
Karpowicz, and this fact was, among other things, depicted in two 
books of  poetry (Pęd pogoni, pęd ucieczki, published in 1968, and Akt 
Urodzenia, published in 1969. Thanks to these books, he was accepted 
as a member of  the Polish Writers Association in June 1971 [...] 
However, Krynicki’s opinions can be determined primarily by his 
poems published in the “Odra” monthly, No 10/71, and the “Poezja” 
monthly, No 12/71, which can be read as anti-party and unmoral.46 
The application for the operating talk held on 1 March, 1973 contains 
much stronger characteristics of  Krynicki’s poetry, which “are mainly 
depicted in political poems that strike our reality in a anti-party and 
unmoral way. In March 1972, he wrote the poem ‘PodróŻ pošmiertna,’ 
44  Plan pracy Sekcji IV Wydziału III WUSW we Wrocławiu, AIPN Wr, 054/960, vol. 8. 78, mps.
45  For further details, see Krzysztof  Brzechczyn, “Twórczošć Ryszarda Krynickiego w dokumentach 
SB,” NiezaleŽna Gazeta Polska (October 5, 2007): 7–8.
46  Opinia, AIPN Po 08/923, 212.
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a lampoon ridiculing the present reality, which he wanted to publish 
in the press.”47 The survey records concerning Krynicki include the 
following description of  his poetry: “He writes poems that hostilely 
ridicule the present reality and alliance with the Soviet Union. Some of  
them, the poems, are published abroad, e.g. by the Poets’ and Painters’ 
Publishing House in London.”48 
Further assessments of  Krynicki’s works were made by Security 
Service offi cers from Poznań, to where he moved. The “Information 
on Ryszard Krynicki” addressed to the Chief  of  the 3rd Department of  
the Ministry of  Internal Affairs, dated 28 February, 1974, specifi es that 
poems by Krynicki are “imbued with hatred towards the system, the 
social and political relationships in the People’s Republic of  Poland, 
and the party apparatus and the Ministry of  Internal Affairs.”49 The 
“Notice on poet Ryszard Krynicki,” dated 12 March, 1974 states 
that the poet, “through his works protests, criticizes, expresses his 
pessimism, and negates all undeniable achievements of  our reality.”50 
These assessments are repeated and amplifi ed in the “Notice on 
inspection of  the ‘Renegat’ operating inquiry,” dated 30 September, 
1974, which states that poems by Krynicki “are imbued with furious 
hatred towards the system, social and political relationships in the 
People’s Republic of  Poland, the party apparatus, and the Ministry of  
Internal Affairs and the Soviet Union.”51
It is noteworthy that expressions repeated in the fi rst part of  the opinion 
such as “can” and “can be read” may be interpreted as a sign of  hesitation on 
the part of  the Security Service offi cers regarding how to qualify the Krynicki 
case: opposition features in his poems are a display of  poetical extravagance 
or an intentionally chosen political attitude. Further assessments of  poems 
by Krynicki do not express these doubts, and the assessors accused the poet 
of  being extremely hostile towards the system: showing “furious” hatred 
towards the system, the party, the Ministry of  Internal Affairs, and the Soviet 
Union. 
Can these opinions be interesting and useful for a historian of  Polish 
literature or a literary critic? No, or at most with qualifi cations. However, this 
47  Wniosek o przeprowadzenie rozmowy operacyjnej z obywatelem Krynickim Ryszardem, 24 II 1973, AIPN Po 
08/923, 227.
48  Kwestionariusz ewidencyjny, AIPN Po 08/923, 200.
49  Informacja dotycząca Ryszarda Krynickiego, AIPN Po 08/923, 115.
50  Notatka dotycząca literata Krynickiego Ryszarda, AIPN Po 08/923, 194.
51  Notatka z kontroli operacyjnego rozpracowania kryptonim “Renegat”, 30 IX 1974, AIPN Po 08/923, 271. 
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is not because of  the primitivism of  the analyses (or at least this is not the 
key factor), but rather because of  the established objective. In general, two 
types of  interpretation are used in the humanities: historical and adaptive.52 
Interpretations aim to establish the meaning of  a literary work, which is usually 
regarded as the product of  the intentional activity of  the author of  the work. If  
the interpretation reveals the purpose of  the author of  the piece of  literature, 
then it pertains to the historical interpretation. In this case, we ask what the 
author had in mind (what he wished to achieve) when writing this poem and not 
another. In turn, when the interpreter attributes a specifi c meaning to the work 
based on the socio-cultural background of  the author, i.e. his or her voice is 
interpreted as the expression of  certain group interests and thus an expression 
of  an objective adapted by a certain group, then this interpretation is called 
adaptive. Normally, this is the dividing line between the task of  a historian of  
literature who does historical interpretation and that of  a literary critic who 
performs adaptive interpretation. 
If  this division is applied, then the analysis on Krynicki’s poetry conducted 
by the Security Service would be rather similar to the adaptive interpretation.53 
Their aim was not to seek aesthetical or axiological values of  his poems, but to 
reply to the question as to whether and to what extent they constitute a threat to 
the system of  the People’s Republic of  Poland. The prepared plan for an operating 
talk included a question about the possible directions of  Krynicki’s poems and 
their aims. During his interrogation, the poet replied to this question and said 
that he wrote love poetry, but his reply was not approved by a Security Service 
interlocutor because, as the offi cer stated, further analyses of  his poetry did not 
follow that path. The Security Service’s analysis is useful in a reconstruction of  
the following: whether and to what extent Krynicki’s poetry represented a threat 
to the service’s control over social life in the People’s Republic of  Poland. The 
analyses of  poetry were only intended to meet this objective. 
52  Leszek Nowak, “Remarks on the Christian Model of  Man and the Nature of  Interpretation,” Social 
Theory and Practice 15 (1989): 107–17. Leszek Nowak, “O interpretacji adaptacyjnej,” in Sztuka i jej poznawanie, 
ed. Janusz Grad and Teresa Kostyrko (Poznań: Bogucki 2008), 230–42.  
53  Both types of  interpretation are considered correct provided that they comply with some conditions: 
they contain no self-contradictions, they cover the entire text, etc. These criteria were not met by the 
interpretation of  poetry included in the Security Service activity and focused on one issue, threats to the 
stabilization of  political power in the People’s Republic of  Poland. 
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Conclusions: From the Source Optics to the Historian’s Optics: Methodological 
Remarks 
As a result of  the massive introduction of  sources once produced by the 
apparatus of  repression into scientifi c circulation following the establishment 
of  the IPN, historians who had access to those sources were tempted to commit 
“seven deadly fi le sins” as described by Włodzimierz Suleja, director of  the IPN, 
Wrocław Branch.54 The discovery and initial scientifi c circulation of  sources 
which were hitherto unknown and which in principle allowed historians to 
challenge previous historiographical fi ndings led to pride. Pride was accompanied 
by greed, expressed by the willingness to introduce “into scientifi c circulation 
newer and newer documents, miscellaneous documents, or articles without 
proper consideration of  critical analysis or skills-based processing.”55 There was 
a certain gluttony in the handling of  topics for which a historian is unprepared 
in terms of  his or her skills. This sin was complemented by sloth, i.e. reluctance 
on the part of  the historian to verify fi ndings by consulting sources and the 
historiography. The formal fi ndings were accompanied by wrath, expressed by 
giving moral evaluations that undermined the reliability of  the fi ndings. When 
these fi ndings were not accepted by historians, this was met with envy: though 
wearing a prosecutor’s gown, the historian, subjected to scientifi c criticism, was 
forced to prove and still verify his or her fi ndings. This is why, according to 
Włodzimierz Suleja, history became a fi eld of  science subjected to the sin of  
lust, “scientists take actions to meet political orders so as to use random and 
partial fi ndings in the utilitarian and short-term power play.”56 
It may be true that it is diffi cult to fi nd a historian who had literally committed 
the aforementioned “deadly fi le sins,” but this does not mean that Włodzimierz 
Suleja’s description is completely groundless. If  it is considered as an ideal type 
of  the research attitude, this description more or less accurately summarizes the 
practice of  the empirical historians. It is worth wondering what the origin of  this 
practice is and whether it is an escalating phenomenon. 
54  Włodzimierz Suleja, “Złudny czar teczek, czyli ‘teczkowe grzechy główne,’” in Od Piłsudskiego do Wałęsy. 
Studia z dziejów Polski w XX wieku, ed. Krzysztof  Persak, Antoni Dudek, Andrzej Friszke, Łukasz Kamiński, 
Paweł Machcewicz, Piotr Osęka, Paweł Sowiński, Dariusz Stola, Marcin Zaremba (Warsaw: IPN/ISP PAN, 
2008), 512–16. The global assessment of  the historiographical output of  the IPN, see: Włodzimierz Suleja, 
“Miejsce Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej w badaniach nad dziejami PRL,” Dzieje Najnowsze  3 (2010): 81–112.
55  Suleja, “Złudny czar,” 513. Cf. Jerzy Eisler’s opinion in: “Ankieta historyczna,” Pamięć i Sprawiedliwošć 
1, no. 3 (2003): 29.
56  Suleja, “Złudny,” 514.
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It seems that one of  the reasons behind the commission of  these deadly 
sins is the failure to adhere to the standard rules adopted in the interpretation 
of  historical sources (internal and external criticism, establishment of  a list of  
questions, the use of  contextual knowledge, including historiographical fi ndings, 
etc.). The failure to adhere to these rules in the use of  these sources results in 
the uncritical acceptance of  a mode of  perceiving the social world as presented 
exactly by these sources: details concerning facts, the global interpretation of  
events and processes, the failure to contrast information included in these 
sources with information drawn from other types of  sources and contextual 
knowledge. 
These failures are neither necessarily inscribed in the sources gathered in 
the IPN nor are they the outcome of  a lack of  methodological rigor. The IPN’s 
archival records are not defective, whatever their opponents may claim. They are 
neither worse nor better than sources that have been collected in other archival 
records. Nor do they constitute a fundamentally new type of  source that requires 
the profound rethinking of  conventional classifi cations of  sources. Their only 
novelty is that they must be understood in terms of  their content because they 
shed light on the backstage of  political power: the mechanisms with which the 
control and surveillance of  society was maintained on a massive scale.
The transgressions specifi ed by Włodzimierz Suleja, which have been 
committed by historians from and outside of  the IPN, were intensifi ed through 
the circulation of  new content-based types of  sources on a massive scale. First, 
heuristic rules of  interpretation did not develop because as of  yet they have 
been unable to do so. Second, this novelty effect led to the emergence of  the 
erroneous belief  according to which the introduction of  the sources made by 
the apparatus of  repression of  the People’s Republic of  Poland into circulation 
within the historiography is in and of  itself  enough to foment a historiographical 
revolution. In this respect, Sławomir Cenckiewicz’s statement from 2005 is 
characteristic, “in light of  more and more unrestricted access to a new type of  
source, namely documents of  the Security Service, most of  the previous studies 
[about Solidarity – K.B.] (made before 2000) should be considered incomplete, 
insuffi cient, outdated or simply unreliable.”57 
57  Cenckiewicz, “Znaczenie archiwaliów,” 218. it is also noteworthy that in the aforesaid article this 
historian contended that the only obstacles that impeded the use of  sources made by the apparatus of  
repression of  the People’s Republic of  Poland were the incompleteness and disorder of  archival records 
maintained by the IPN.  
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The revolution in historiography, however, is not only a result of  the 
discovery of  new types of  sources, but needs also to be associated with new 
interpretations of  these sources and a separate explanation of  previously known 
historical facts. In addition, only a relevant accumulation of  historiographical 
works stimulates methodological refl ection on the mode of  using the sources, 
construction of  the historiographical narration and explanatory rules. The 
critical discussion between historians and researchers representing other fi elds 
of  the sciences and having various theoretical opinions also plays an important 
role.58
One can fi nd hope for the future in the growing number of  works that 
were written over the course of  the past ten years concerning criticism of  
the sources held by the Institute of  National Remembrance,59 and to a lesser 
extent the methodological and theoretical refl ections that have been raised.60 As 
Włodzimierz Suleja observes:
The security services’ materials are specifi c sources that yield 
exceptionally little when processed on a critical and analytical basis. To 
read this symbolic fi le, it is not enough only to have standard equipment 
without essential knowledge of  the government structure, its people, 
directions and techniques of  operational actions. It is true that as a rule 
the Security Service did not forge its documents. This however does 
not mean that the information included in these documents is the truest 
58  For example, a journalist of  a large daily paper critically evaluated the scientifi c output of  a regional 
IPN branch in a large city and considered it too “conservative” because employees of  the Public Education 
Regional Offi ce of  the Institute of  National Remembrance (OBEP IPN) revealed too few security secret 
collaborators in comparison with other branches. About disputes on the history of  the People’s Republic 
of  Poland, see: Rafał Stobiecki, Historiografi a PRL. Ani dobra, ani mądra, ani piękna… ale skomplikowana 
(Warsaw: Trio, 2007), 299–345.
59  The following works merit mention in this context: Filip Musiał, ed., Wokół teczek bezpieki – zagadnienia 
metodologiczno-Żródłoznawcze (Krakow: IPN, 2006); Filip Musiał, Podręcznik bezpieki. Teoria pracy operacyjnej 
SłuŽby Bezpieczeństwa w šwietle wydawnictw resortowych Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych PRL (Krakow: IPN, 
2007); J. Bednarek, P. Perzyna, ed., W kręgu teczek. Z badań nad zasobem i funkcjami archiwum Instytutu Pamięci 
Narodowej (ŁódŻ–Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2007); Filip Musiał, ed. Osobowe Żródła informacji - zagadnienia 
metodologiczno-Żródłoznawcze (Krakow: Societas Vistulana, 2008). Critically, on the methodological output of  
IPN, see: Piotr Witek, “Historyk wobec metodologii,” Pamięć i Sprawiedliwošć 2 (2012): 79–102.   
60  The following works merit mention in this context: Krzysztof  Brzechczyn, ed., Oblicza komunistycznego 
zniewolenia. Między nauką a literaturą (Poznań: IPN, 2009); Krzysztof  Brzechczyn, ed., Obrazy PRL. O 
konceptualizacji realnego socjalizmu w Polsce (Poznań: IPN, 2008); Sławomir M. Nowinowski, Jan Pomorski, 
Rafał Stobiecki, eds., Pamięć i polityka historyczna. Došwiadczenia Polski i jej sąsiadów (ŁódŻ: IPN, 2008), Tomasz 
Błaszczyk, Krzysztof  Brzechczyn, Daniel Ciunajcis, Michał Kierzkowski, eds., Uwikłania historiografi i. 
Między ideologizacją dziejów a obiektywizmem badawczym (Poznań: IPN, 2011).  
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truth. But if  the researcher, irrespective of  his or her fi eld of  expertise 
or experience, does not have any knowledge of  the present objectives 
of  the ministry (these objectives have changed) or the system of  values 
professed in this environment (real, not declared, even during meeting 
of  the POP), if  he or she does not break this hermetic language code, 
this specifi c kind of  the Security Service newspeak, then the researcher 
will fail.61
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